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Abstract - This paper proposed an efficient strong password authenticated key agreement protocol based on the straight-line 
property of geometry.  The proposed scheme does not perform public key cryptographic functions while most of the 
previous strong password authenticated key agreement schemes based on them.  All of the operations used in the proposed 
scheme are more efficient than the modular exponentiation which is the kernel operation of the public key cryptographic 
functions.  The proposed scheme is more efficient than the previous research results.  It withstands the unknown key share 
attack and password guessing attack, although clients select weak password.  It provides forward secrecy, known-key 
security and robust characteristic.  The proposed scheme is categorized to be a bilateral commitment mode which is defined 
in IEEE P1363.2 / D13.  It is secure.  The proposed scheme provides best solution with results of efficiency, security and 
functionalities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Identity authentication and confidentiality are 
primary services of secure communications.  It is 
important to authenticate each other when the client 
and the server want to communicate through the open 
network [5, 6, 7].  How to protect the confidential 
data transmitted between the client and server is also 
an important issue.  Authenticated key agreement 
protocol is a good solution to provide authentication 
and confidentiality services.  By this protocol, the 
client and server not only authenticate each other but 
also generate a secret session key.  They can use the 
session key and cryptosystem to protect the 
confidential transmitted data.  Password-based 
mechanism is the most widely used method for user 
authentication since it allows people to choose and 
keep password by himself.  However, people are used 
to choose easy-to-remember passwords.  These weak 
passwords are vulnerable to password guessing 
attacks because of limited password spaces are 
searchable and low-entropy.  Jablon [4] considers the 
protocols should be designed to protect weak-willed 
and weak-minded clients.  Authenticated key 
agreement protocol based on weak password is 
referred to as strong password authenticated key 
agreement protocol.  IEEE P1363.2 / D13 [3] 
regulates its definition and security requirements.  In 
general, the strong password authenticated key 
agreement protocol considers the scenario in which 
there are two entities: a client A and a server B; A 
holds a weak password.  These two parties would like 
to engage in a conversation at the end of which each 
one generates a secret common session key that is 
known to nobody but the two of them. 
 
The strong password authenticated key agreement 
protocol must satisfy many security properties.  SRP-
1 [11] strengths the requirements further as follows: 
1. Revealing useless information about password or 
secret key to attacker in communication for 
preventing attacker can able to guess and verify. 
2. Revealing useless information about session key 
to attacker, since session key is a strong 
cryptographic key instead of a low-entropy 
password to protect the transmitted data. 
3. Even if an attacker has the ability to interfere 
with clients and server, the protocol should 
prevent the attacker to get resources from server 
or learn any information about passwords or 
session keys.  At worst, the attacker only causes 
the protocol to fail between two parties. 
4. If the server’s verification table is captured or 
stolen, the attacker is still unable to impersonate 
the client; but for mutual authentication reason, 
the attacker is also unable to impersonate server 
(termed stolen-verifier attack). 
5. Revealing the password to an attacker, he does 
not obtain the session key of past sessions 
(forward secrecy). 
6. Even though attacker steals session key, he does 
not carry out a brute-force guessing attack on 
password (forward secrecy). 
 
A strong password authenticated key agreement 
protocol with above properties is robust.  Bellovin 
and Merritt first proposed the strong password 
authenticated key agreement protocol based on pre-
shared weak password known as Encrypted Key 
Exchange (EKE) [1] by combining symmetric and 
public-key cryptography.  There are a series of 
protocols proposed after EKE [1].  SPEKE [4] is 
based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange technology 
(DH for short).  Zhang [16] showed SPEKE [4] is 
susceptible to off-line password guessing attack.   
 
We proposed a verifier-based protocol known as 
Secure Remote Password (SRP-1) [11] based on DH 
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that the server’s verification table stored the static-
verifier instead of password.  The advantage of 
verifier is that it provides a high-entropy than that of 
password.  SRP-1 [11] cannot defeat stolen-verifier 
attack.  Wu proposed SRP-3[12] later on.  Since SRP-
3 [12] is vulnerable to two-for-one guessing attack 
and message ordering problem, SPR-6 [13] is then 
presented.  However, in SRP-6 [13], the attacker can 
pose as server by stealing verifier and then to cheat 
client’s secret information.  It is also insecure against 
unknown key share attack [3] and user table insert / 
update attack [10].  Yeh et al. proposed a simple 
authenticated key agreement protocol resistant to 
password guessing attacks called SAKA [14] which 
is based on DH.  Lee et al. [8] improved the 
efficiency of the SAKA [14] using parallel 
computation technology called parallelizable SAKA 
(PSAKA).  
 
However, both of SAKA [14] and PSAKA [8] are 
vulnerable to undetectable on-line password guessing 
attack, and unknown key share attack.  Different from 
above protocols that are based on DH, Yeh et al. [15] 
proposed a protocol, which combined symmetric, 
RSA cryptography and suitable imbalanced network.  
However, as Yeh et al. [15] uses insecure parameter 
(the public key e of RSA is 3) for imbalanced 
network, it is unable to defeat off-line password 
guessing attack and user table insert / update attack.  
In a word, some of these research results had been 
considered as unsecured in the related papers, and 
some do not satisfy the strong definition.  It is clearly 
that all of these research results are based on public-
key cryptography.  Most public-key functions such as 
DH or RSA have to perform modular exponentiation, 
they consume higher computational cost. 
 
This paper proposes a new efficient strong password 
authenticated key agreement protocol based on the 
straight-line property of geometry.  All of the 
operations included in the proposed scheme take less 
computation cost than modular exponentiation.  It 
takes lower computation cost.  The clients are 
allowed to use weak passwords.  The proposed 
scheme conforms to forward secrecy, robust [11] and 
the bilateral commitment mode.  The bilateral 
commitment mode is more secure than both safe 
unilateral commitment mode and unilateral 
commitment mode [3].  These three modes are 
defined in IEEE P1363.2 / D13 [3].Furthermore, it 
includes the advantages of all previous schemes.  The 
proposed scheme provides best solution with results 
of efficiency, security and functionalities. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  
Section 2 shows the proposed scheme.  Then, the 
security of the proposed scheme is demonstrated in 
Section 3.  Section 4 will discuss and compare 
performance, security and functionalities of proposed 
scheme with pervious schemes.  Finally, the 
conclusion is made in Section 5. 
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
The proposed strong password authenticated key 
agreement protocol does not include Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange functions while most of the related 
scheme based on it.  It is more efficient and secure 
than the previous results.  There are two entities: 
server and clients in the strong password 
authenticated key agreement protocol.  The server 
maintains a verification table that stored clients’ 
verifier.  The verifier will be altered after each legal 
login process for security consideration.  The server 
keeps a secret key.  Clients keep devices such as 
smart card that stores parameters for authentication.  
Table 1 defines the notations that are used in this 
paper. 
 
 
Table 1.  Notations 
The proposed scheme contains two phases, the 
registration phase and the login phase.  In the 
registration phase, a new client chooses his 
identification code and password to register and 
obtains a smart card from the server.  In the login 
phase, the client and server authenticate each other 
and exchange data to generate a common session key.  
These two phases are described in the following 
subsections. 
 
2.1. Registration Phase 
When a new client wants to login to Server B, the 
client must perform the following steps to register at 
Server B beforehand.  Firstly, the new client chooses 
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his own identity A and password P, and passes to 
Server B at the time T secretly.  Server B generates 
parameters through the following steps and stores 
them into smart card to hand over to Client A.   
Step R1.  Computes dA = h(Ad), v1 = h(PT), VA = 
dA v1,where v1 is Client A’s initial verifier, and 
stores VA in the verification table.   
Step R2.  Computes C = dAP and D = h(v1) P and 
saves {A, C, D} into smart card. 
Step R3.  Server B delivers the smart card to Client 
A. 
Client A is allowed to login to Server B by using the 
smart card which keeps the authenticated parameters 
secretly. 
 
2.2. Login Phase 
In this phase, clients and Server B authenticate each 
other and exchange data to generate a shared session 
key K.  They perform key confirmation operations to 
assure the session key.  Assuming a registered 
clientA wants to login to Server B at ith time, A 
inserts the smart card and inputs password P.  Server 
B and Client A perform the following steps to 
complete the login process.  
Step L1.  Client A inputs password P and computes 
dA = CP, h(vi) = DP.   
Step L2.  Client A chooses two random numbers N1 
andN2.  He also constructs a straight line L based on 
(N1, N2) and (dA, h(vi)).  Here, L: y = f(x) = ax + b 
mod q, where a = ((N2h(vi)) / (N1 dA)) mod q, b = 
(h(vi) dAa) mod q, moreover a 0 and b 0.   
Step L3.  Client A calculates C1 = a dA, C2 = b 
h(vi) and vi+1 = f(h(vi)).  Next, computes R1 = h(A, 
vi+1, a), h() is a strongly collision-free hash function.  
Finally, Client A sends {A, C1, C2, R1} to Server B. 
Step L4.  Server Bretrieves Client A’s VA from 
verification table and computes the following 
parameters:  
dA = h(Ad), vi = VAdA, 
a = C1dA, 
b = C2h(vi), 
and reconstructs the line L: y = f(x) = ax + b mod q.  
Later, Server B generates vi+1 = f(h(vi)).  Using the 
hash function to compute h(A, vi+1, a) and checking 
whether it equals to R1.  If the equation is false, 
Server Brejects Client A’s login request; otherwise, 
Server B confirms the identity of Client A.   
Step L5.  Server B chooses a random number N3. 
Then computes R2 = h(B, vi+1, b) and C3 = ER2(N3, 
h(N3)).  Server B sends {B, C3} to Client A. 
Step L6.  Client A calculates R2 = h(B, vi+1, b) where 
vi+1 and b are generated in Step L3, and decrypts C3 to 
get N3′ and h(N3) with key R2, i.e. DR2(C3).  Next, 
Client A uses hash function to compute h(N3′) and 
check whether it equals to h(N3).  If the equation is 
false, Client Acan not assure himself that it is Server 
B and hewill abort the connection; otherwise, Client 
Aassures himself that it isServer B and believes 
Server B has a proper value vi+1.  Finally, Client A 
sends the message {h(N3′)} to Server B. 
Step L7.  Upon receiving h(N3′).  If it is incorrect, 
Server Bcan not confirm Client A in producing the 
common session key, then Server B denies the login 
request; otherwise Server B believes Client A gets the 
correct N3 and the same value vi+1. 
Step L8.  Client A and Server B generate the share 
session key K = N3vi+1 separately. 
Step L9.  Client A updates D stored in smart card 
with h(vi+1)P.  Server B updates Client A’s VA with 
dAvi+1 in the verification table.   
 
In Steps L4 and L6, both Client A and Server B 
confirm the identity of each other at first and then 
exchange the parameter of the session key.  They 
perform the key confirmation operations in Steps L5, 
L6 and L7 to confirm that theother party actually 
possess the session key K.  We conclude the proposed 
scheme is a mutual authentication mechanism and 
conforms to the bilateral commitment mode defined 
in IEEE P1363.2 / D13 [Error! Reference source 
not found.]. 
 
In addition, the proposed scheme provides clients to 
change the password themselves without connecting 
to Server B.  The step of changing password is to 
change C = dAP PP′andD = h(vi) P PP′ 
stored in smart card, where P is theold password and 
P′ is the new password.  That is Server B is not to 
know clients’ password. 
 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
Strong password authenticated key agreement 
protocol should be satisfy security requirements and 
defeat some possible attacks.  Especially, password 
guessing attack is always considered as the most 
vulnerable one and it caused some past proposed 
schemes to be considered as insecure.  Moreover, the 
scheme should provide forward secrecy.  This section 
demonstrates the proposed scheme withstands these 
attacks. 
 
3.1. Stolen-Verifier Attack 
In the proposed scheme, the client’s verifier is 
generated by a randomly straight line function in each 
login process.  After each login successfully, the 
server will update the client’s verifier, which is 
protected by server’s secret key d with VA (= dAvi; 
dA = h(Ad)).  Suppose the adversary intrudes Server 
B and steals Client A’s VA, according to XOR 
characteristic, the probability to compute vi without 
dA is 2-|vi|.   
 
The adversary without corrected vican notfigure out 
suitable C1, C2, and R1 to pass through server’s 
examinationin Step L4, so the adversary can not 
impersonate Client A to finish the ith login process.  
The adversary also cannot masquerade Server B 
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although he stole the verifier, because hestill cannot 
construct the correct straight line L to compute C3 
and pass through Client A’s examination in Step L6. 
 
3.2. Replay Attack 
The adversary fails in impersonating Client A to 
finish the (i + 1)th login process by replaying Client 
A’sith login message {A, C1,i, C2,i, R1,i}.  Server B 
verifies the equation h(A, vi+2, a) = R1,i in Step L4 of 
the (i + 1)th login process.  It is false because the 
values vi, vi+1, and vi+2 are dependent upon three 
randomly unrelated straight line functions 
individually.  The adversary can not replay previous 
login message for impersonating Client A to login 
Server B. 
 
3.3.Denial Of Service Attack (Dos Attack) 
The DoS attack [Error! Reference source not 
found.] is an attack that causing the legitimate client 
to bedenied by server.  If the adversary modifies the 
transmitted message when a legitimate client changes 
password or verifier, then the server or the legitimate 
client will update the wrong password or verifier.  
The legitimate client will fail to login server. We will 
demonstrate the proposed scheme defeats DoS attack. 
There are three transmitted messages in the login 
phase.  To begin with, assumingthe adversary 
modifies the first transmitted message {A, C1, C2, R1} 
which Client A sent, that bring Server B to get two 
different values a′ and b′ in Step L4, and then 
constructs the different straight line function f′().  
However, the probability of two different straight line 
functions map the same output vi+1 is 2-|q|.  It is very 
low on condition that q is large enough.  Moreover, it 
should satisfy the verifying equation h(A, vi+1, a′) = 
R1 in Step L4.  According to strongly collision-free 
hash function properties, it is computationally 
infeasible that the adversary can find two distinct 
messages that will hash to the same value.  Others, if 
the adversary modifies the second transmitted 
message {B, C3} or third {h(N3′)}.  Client A in Step 
L6 or Server B in Step L7, they will check whether 
the equation is true or false by hash function; by the 
strongly collision-free hash function properties, it is 
computationally infeasible that the adversary can 
make two distinct messages to the same hash-value to 
pass their checks.  By the three cases above, the 
successful probability of adversary’s actions is very 
low that is negligible.  And the verifier in clients or 
server will not be updated improper.  Thus, the 
proposed scheme defeats the DoS attack. 
 
3.4. Password Guessing Attack 
Ding [Error! Reference source not found.] divided 
password guessing attack into three classes:  
detectable on-line password guessing attack, 
undetectable on-line password guessing attack and 
off-line password guessing attack.  In particular, off-
line password guessing attack is considered as the 
heavy threat.  According to these classes, we will 
show the proposed scheme against the attacks even if 
clients choose weak password.   
It is clearly that our scheme can detect mistakes in 
each transmitted message described in DoS attack.  
The proposed scheme is easy to distinguish between a 
legitimate party and the adversary.  The proposed 
scheme defeats the detectable and undetectable on-
line password guessing attacks.  We will demonstrate 
the scheme can also defeat the off-line password 
guessing attack in the following paragraph. 
If the adversary collects the login messages 
transferred between Client A and Server B, the 
messages are {A, C1, C2, R1} and {B, C3}; in which, 
C1 = adA, C2 = b h(vi), R1 = h(A, vi+1, a) with vi+1 
= f(h(vi)), C3 = ER2(N3, h(N3)) where R2 = h(B, vi+1, 
b).  The values C1, C2, R1 and C3 are all included 
random numbers.  Especially, these parameters are 
independent of the client’s password.  The adversary 
will fail to guess or learn the password from the 
transmitted message of the proposed scheme.  
Therefore, although our scheme allows clients to 
choose weak password, it still can defeat the heavy 
threat: off-line password guessing attack. 
 
3.5. Forward Secrecy 
SRP-1 [Error! Reference source not found.] 
defines forward secrecy in two meanings, we 
examines our scheme as follows:  
1. The attacker can not get any information of the 
previous session keys by revealing Client A’s 
password. 
Assuming the adversary gets Client A’s password P 
and smart card which stored C and D inside.  The 
adversary will get dA and h(vi) by dA = C P and h(vi) 
= D P.  Since h() is a strongly collision-free hash 
function with irreversible, the adversary can not 
figure out vi from h(vi), where vi is the verifier for 
next (ith) login.  At the same time, the adversary also 
records (i - 1)th login message as {A, C1,i-1, C2,i-1, R1,i-
1} and {B, C3,i-1}, he will get ai-1 = C1,i-1dA,but he 
can not get h(vi-1) from h(vi), and bi-1.  The 
probability of figuring out bi-1 is 2-|q| that considerably 
guessed directly.  That is to say the adversary can not 
construct the correct straight line function fi-1() 
without getting bi-1 and h(vi-1).  He would fail to 
compute R2,i-1anddecrypt C3,i-1 to get N3,i-1.  Without 
N3,i-1 and vi, the adversary can not obtain (i- 1)th 
session key K (= N3,i-1vi).  In the same situation, the 
adversary is hard to derive the session keys of (i- 2)th, 
(i- 3)th etc. by revealing password and getting smart 
card.  Thus, our scheme provides forward secrecy. 
2. Although the adversary stole the session key, it 
cannot assist him to get the password by the brute-
force guessing attack. 
 
The session key K (= N3vi+1) was generated after 
Client A’s ith login, where N3 is a random number 
and vi+1 is calculated by a random straight line 
function f().  It is clear that the session key K is 
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composed of two random factors, and does not 
include any information of password P and any 
verifiable data.  Hence, the adversary is purely able to 
guess password by brute-force attack even thought 
session key has been stolen.  Therefore, our scheme 
conforms to this definition. 
By the above descriptions, our scheme satisfies the 
property of forward secrecy. 
 
3.6. Known-Key Security 
Known-key security is that an attacker compromises 
the session key, but he can not compromise future 
session keys based the compromised key.  Moreover, 
he can not control the value of the future session keys.  
The objective of known-key security is to protect 
other sessions and limit damage only in the 
compromised session, which caused by the 
compromised session key.   
Suppose the (i+ 1)th session key Ki+1 is equal to 
N3,i+1vi+2 and the attacker gets the ith session key 
Ki(= N3,i vi+1) of the proposed scheme.  However, 
Client A separately computes vi+1 and vi+2 from two 
unrelated straight lines Li and Li+1 in Steps L3 of ith 
and (i+ 1)th sessions.  Li and Li+1 are randomly 
generated in Steps L2 of ith and (i+ 1)th sessions 
separately by Client A.  N3,i and N3,i+1 are randomly 
selected by Server B in Steps L5 of ith and (i+ 1)th 
sessions separately.  The attacker is hard to decide 
N3,i+1 and vi+2 to generate Ki+1, although he 
compromised Ki.  Thus, the attacker cannot compute 
or control the future session keys based on the 
compromised session key. 
 
3.7. Unknown Key Share Attack 
There are two points of the unknown key share attack 
in IEEE P1363.2 / D13 [Error! Reference source 
not found.]. One is that Client A uses the same 
password P with Server B and B′, the adversary 
redirects the login messages to Server B′ when Client 
A sends login messages to Server B.  The client does 
not correctly identify the target party and causes two 
wrong parties to share session key.  Client A 
considers that he shares the key with Server B but 
actually with Server B′.  Another is that both Clients 
A and C use the same password P with Server B.  The 
adversary replaces the identification A of the login 
message with C when Client A sends the login 
messages to Server B.  The server does not correctly 
identify theclient.  Server B considers that it is talking 
with Client C but actual with Client A.  According to 
these two points, we show that the proposed scheme 
withstands the unknown key share attack.  
 
1.  The adversary redirects Client A’s login 
messages to Server B′ 
 
In this case, the adversary redirects Client A’s login 
messages {A, C1, C2, R1} to Server B′, where C1 = a 
dA, C2= b h(vi) and dA is generated by Server B 
for Client A (dA = h(A d), d is the secret key of 
Server B).  Server B′ receives Client A’s login 
messages and computes dA′ = h(Ad′) where d′ is 
thesecret key of Server B′ in Step L4.  Server B′ gets 
a′ = C1dA′ and b′ = C2h(vi′), andvi′ is fetched from 
verification table in Server B′.  As the results of a′ 
a,and b′ b, the equation h(A, vi+1, a) = R1 is false in 
Step L4, and Server B′ will abort the connection.  The 
adversary will pass this checking on condition that d 
= d′, and vi = vi′, but the probability is 2-|d| 2-|vi|.  It is 
too small to negligible.   
2.  The adversary replaces the identification of 
Client A with Client C 
When Client A sends the login messages {A, C1, C2, 
R1} to Server B, the adversary attempts to make 
Server B to consider that it’s Client C by intercepting 
and replacing Client A’s validity messages with {C, 
C1, C2, R1}.  After Server B receivingthe messages, it 
computes dC = h(Cd), vi,C= VCdC, a′ = C1dCand 
b′ = C2h(vi,C), but a′ a, and b′ b.  Server B will 
construct another straight line L′: y′ = f′(x) = a′x+ b′ 
mod q and vi+1,C = f′(h(vi,C)).  However, the equation 
h(C, vi+1,C, a′) = R1 (= h(A, vi+1,A, a))will be false in 
Step L4.  Server B detects this attack,and the 
adversary failed.  The adversary will achieve the goal 
on condition that dC = dA, and VC = VA, the 
probability is 2-|dC| 2-|VC|.  By the strongly collision-
free hash function, it is computationally infeasible 
that the adversary could find two distinct values (A, 
C) with the same hash-value.  Therefore, our scheme 
has ability to defeat the attack. 
Clearly, the proposed scheme does securely identify 
the intended target. 
 
3.8. User Table Insert / Update Attack 
Wang [Error! Reference source not found.] points 
out that the verification table, whichstores the 
password kept in plaintext or hashed, is easy to 
retrieve or update client’s data.  It is not secure.  
Assuming the adversary can access the verification 
table of Server B, and he wants to add an illegal client 
C into the verification table for login to get resources.  
The adversary has to generate some parameters as 
Server B in the “registration phase”, he chooses 
password P and computes v1 =h(P  T), where T is 
the registering time.  However, the adversary does not 
know Server B’s secret key d, he cannot compute the 
suitable values dC(= h(Cd)) and VC(= dC v1).  
Therefore, even though the adversary has ability to 
access the verification table, he also cannot generate 
thecorrect information.  The adversary mighteven 
write incorrect value VC′, whichwill be detected in 
Step L4.  Hence, our scheme provides a secure 
verification table to prevent user table insert / update 
attack.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper proposed an efficient strong password 
authenticated key agreement protocol based on the 
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straight-line property of geometry.  Clients allowed 
choosing weak password,but the scheme still can 
defeat password guessing attacks.  The proposed 
scheme satisfies the definition of strong scheme, 
robust [Error! Reference source not found.], 
bilateral commitment mode [Error! Reference 
source not found.] and security requirements such as 
forward secrecy, known-key security and unknown 
key share attack etc.  The characteristics of the 
proposed schemeare usingdynamic-verifier and 
changing password without connecting to server.  The 
proposed scheme doesnot perform modular 
exponentiation computations.  In comparison with 
previous well-known protocols [Error! Reference 
source not found., Error! Reference source not 
found., Error! Reference source not found., Error! 
Reference source not found.], the proposed scheme 
is more efficient and secure. 
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